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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Retroactivity rules in state post-conviction proceedings, although 
seemingly technical and arcane, affect countless lives and implicate 
important questions of judicial federalism. This Article argues that 
state courts can and should provide a forum to vindicate federal con-
stitutional rights for state prisoners whose convictions are already fi-
nal, even—or especially—when federal courts refuse relief. While re-
cent Supreme Court rulings have eased the limits on retroactive relief 
for new “substantive” rules that redefine classes of defendants or the 
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elements of the underlying criminal conduct,1 retroactive relief re-
mains elusive for new rules of criminal procedure that are announced 
only after a criminal defendant’s conviction becomes final.2 
 In the quarter-century that has elapsed since the governing federal 
retroactivity regime was announced in Teague v. Lane,3 the Court has 
yet to permit the retroactive application of a new criminal procedural 
rule announced after a conviction has become final, even in federal 
cases where there are no independent sovereigns to respect,4 and even 
when the death penalty is on the line.5 
 In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Danforth v. Minnesota,6 which 
offered a glimmer of hope for state prisoners to secure post-conviction 
relief based on new rules of criminal procedure. Danforth freed state 
courts to craft their own retroactive remedies and permitted them to 
be more generous than their federal counterparts.7 It did so by delink-
ing the newly announced rule, a question of federal law, from the dis-
tinct question of whether a retroactive remedy was available, a proce-
                                                                                                                                        
 1. See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1259-60 (2016) (holding that the deci-
sion in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which determined that the defini-
tion of prior “violent felony” in the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 
was unconstitutionally vague under due process principles, announced a substantive rule 
that applied retroactively on collateral review); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 
734 (2016) (holding that the decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), prohibiting 
Eighth Amendment mandatory life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders, announced 
a new substantive constitutional rule that was retroactive on state collateral review).  
 2. A note on terminology: By ‘final,’ I am using the working doctrinal definition that 
the direct review process of the state conviction—trial, any state appeals, and any petition 
for certiorari to the Supreme Court—has concluded. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 
321 n.6 (1987) (“By ‘final,’ we mean a case in which a judgment of conviction has been ren-
dered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed 
or a petition for certiorari finally denied.”). Later in the argument, I note that there are some 
types of claims which, because they can be fully and fairly adjudicated for the first time only 
in post-conviction proceedings, are not truly final until after the completion of at least the 
state collateral review process and Supreme Court review of state post-conviction proceed-
ings. I refer to these claims as ‘initial review post-conviction’ claims. By ‘new constitutional 
rules,’ I mean federal constitutional rules that are newly announced after a conviction be-
comes final. 
 3. 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989). 
 4. See, e.g., Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 (2013) (holding that in a 
federal habeas case, the rule in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2009), requiring defense 
counsel to advise the defendant about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea, was 
a new rule of criminal procedure that did not apply retroactively). 
 5. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004) (holding that the Sixth Amend-
ment jury right for capital sentencing that was announced in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002), was properly classified as procedural rather than substantive, was not a watershed 
procedural rule, and thus did not apply to death penalty cases already final on direct review). 
 6. 552 U.S. 264 (2008). 
 7. Id. at 280-81. 
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dural question governed by state law in state post-conviction proceed-
ings and federal law in federal habeas proceedings.8 Post-Danforth, 
therefore, states are empowered to provide retroactive relief in their 
own post-conviction proceedings, even when federal courts would be 
barred from doing so under Teague.9 And just this past Term, the Court 
clarified that although states can be more generous than federal habeas 
courts in applying new rules retroactively, they cannot be stingier.10   
 While Danforth endorsed state courts’ authority to be more gener-
ous than federal courts in providing retroactive collateral relief, Mont-
gomery confirmed that such flexibility is one-sided only.11 An im-
portant role thus remains for federal oversight to ensure that, at least 
for substantive federal rights, which require retroactive application in 
federal court, retroactive relief is also available in state post-conviction 
proceedings. Federal retroactivity rules thus establish a baseline for 
the availability of retroactive relief based on new substantive criminal 
rules, under which the states cannot fall. Part A below, therefore, pro-
vides an overview of the evolution of the federal retroactivity regime, 
which involves both judge-made restrictions to relief first announced 
by the Court in Teague, as well as additional barriers to relief en-
grafted by Congress in 1996 with the enactment of the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).12 
 Against this backdrop, Part B analyzes the Supreme Court’s 2008 
decision in Danforth v. Minnesota and its aftermath in the states. A 
survey of state court rulings post-Danforth shows that many states, 
including Minnesota itself, on remand in Danforth,13 have declined to 
abandon the much-criticized Teague regime.14 Although a smattering 
of states have taken up the offer to be more generous in providing ret-
                                                                                                                                        
 8. Id.  
 9. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989). 
 10. See supra note 1. Notably, Montgomery applies only to new substantive rules. It 
does not address whether state courts would be bound by any Supreme Court determination 
that a new procedural rule should be applied retroactively, probably because, at least since 
Teague was decided, the Court has never announced a new rule protecting criminal proce-
dural rights that has been given retroactive application. See also Colin Starger, Doctrinal 
Desert: A Watershed in Sight?, IN PROGRESS (Oct. 19, 2015), blogs.ubalt.edu/cstarger/ 
2015/10/.../doctrinal-desert-a-watershed-in-sight [https://perma.cc/T3DR-77QB]. 
 11. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 729 (2016). 
 12. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.   
 13. See Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 499-500 (Minn. 2009). 
 14. Georgetown University Law Library Research Services, 50-State Survey of State 
Court Retroactivity Regimes (June 12, 2015) (unpublished survey) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter GULL Survey]; see also Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner at 4a, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2015) (No. 14-280) (describing state 
retroactivity regimes and corroborating survey results).  
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roactive relief, the vast majority remain wedded to the Teague analy-
sis.15 I argue that such a wooden or reflexive adoption of crabbed fed-
eral retroactivity restrictions by state courts simply makes no sense.  
Comity concerns that underpin federal habeas courts’ reluctance to 
disturb state court convictions do not arise when a state court is tasked 
with determining the legality of its own convictions, and finality con-
cerns are overstated and outweighed by the increasingly pressing so-
cial need to remedy illegal convictions and detentions. Finality con-
cerns are also more equitably and directly served by other constraints 
on collateral relief such as statutes of limitations and procedural bars.   
 Part C argues that state courts can and should make the effort to 
extract themselves from Teague’s gravitational pull. Particularly 
when state courts are the only forum available for vindicating a federal 
right—a right that Danforth clarified has always existed and is 
“found,” rather than “made,” when it disentangled the question of the 
right’s existence from the separate question of availability of a rem-
edy—state courts have a constitutional obligation to provide relief.  
Such an obligation is especially strong for those claims that can be 
heard for the first time only in post-conviction proceedings (initial re-
view collateral claims), such as ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) 
on appeal claims, or newly-minted Brady16 claims that emerge only 
after a conviction is final. 
 Where the Teague bar and AEDPA constraints prevent federal 
courts from offering relief, state courts must step in to fill that reme-
dial void. Once the state court forum exists, it is constitutionally obli-
gated to vindicate federal rights. Affording state prisoners post-convic-
tion relief when their conviction or sentence is revealed to have re-
sulted from unconstitutional procedures or invalidated crimes or pen-
alties, moreover, provides one indirect, yet potentially powerful means 
to ameliorate the mass incarceration crisis. While sentencing reforms 
and other measures work on the front end to reduce the number of new 
prisoners, such reforms leave largely untouched the sentences of those 
                                                                                                                                        
 15. GULL Survey, supra note 14, at 1-3 (stating that five states—Alaska, Florida, Mis-
souri, Utah, and West Virginia—have affirmatively chosen not to apply Teague, and instead 
have adopted some variant of the policy-based approach that preceded Teague, announced 
by the Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965)); see Brief for the 
U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 14, at 10a (listing State v. Smart, 
202 P.3d 1130, 1136-38, 1140 (Alaska 2009); Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 956, 960-61 
(Fla. 2015); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 267-68 (Mo. 2003); Labrum v. Utah State Bd. 
of Pardons, 870 P.3d 902, 911-12 (Utah 1993); and State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905, 923-24 
(W. Va. 2012)). The Alaska Supreme Court presaged the rule announced this past term in 
Montgomery and uses Teague as a floor, applying its own Linkletter variant established in 
Judd v. State, 482 P.2d 273 (Alaska 1971), but only after “confirm[ing] that Judd is no less 
protective than the [Teague] standard.” Smart, 202 P.3d at 1138-39. 
 16. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that it violates the Due Process 
Clause for the prosecution to withhold exculpatory evidence that is material to guilt  
or punishment). 
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already convicted. Breaking free from the yoke of Teague and provid-
ing retroactive relief for new criminal procedural rules where the Su-
preme Court refuses to do so offers a pathway towards addressing 
mass incarceration on the back end by refusing to let unconstitutional 
convictions or sentences stand.    
 In hopes of fostering such developments, this Article concludes in 
Part D by urging the criminal defense bar to more aggressively seek 
retroactive relief in state post-conviction proceedings. This can be done 
both by challenging state courts’ wooden application of the inapposite 
Teague procedural bar and by urging those state courts that purport 
to be bound by Teague to be more generous than their federal counter-
parts in how they manipulate the extremely malleable categories for 
classifying newly-announced federal rules. Questions such as whether 
a rule is even truly new or merely an application of an old rule, 
whether a rule should be classified as substantive or procedural, and 
whether, even if procedural, a rule might nonetheless be considered a 
watershed rule that is retroactively applicable are all questions that a 
state can decide for itself under Danforth and that allow a state court 
to award retroactive relief even when such relief was denied by the 
Supreme Court.17     
 This practice coda urges state prisoners and their attorneys to 
make the admittedly extraordinary effort to seek certiorari review of 
state post-conviction rulings if relief is denied at the state level, even 
though procedural obstacles are abundant, and even though the 
chances of certiorari are slim. Given the erosion of federal habeas re-
view resulting from the constraints of AEDPA deference and the im-
possibility of evolving constitutional law after Teague, the best hope of 
shaping favorable new constitutional criminal protections on ques-
tions not yet resolved by the Supreme Court is to directly challenge 
unfavorable state retroactivity rulings.   
A.   Teague, AEDPA, and the Erosion of Federal Habeas Relief for 
State Prisoners 
 Of the more than 1.5 million prisoners incarcerated in the United 
States, some 90% are state or local prisoners, many serving sentences 
spanning decades.18 What happens to these prisoners when the Su-
preme Court decides a case yielding a ‘new’ constitutional rule, which 
                                                                                                                                        
 17. Of course, under Montgomery, if the Supreme Court deems a new rule substantive 
and retroactively applicable, that decision is binding on the state courts. See supra note 1.   
 18. See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2013 1 (2014), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf [https://perma.cc/TN82-BTUT]; see also Marc 
Mauer & David Cole, Opinion, How to Lock Up Fewer People, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2015, at 
SR6 (arguing that mass incarceration needs to be dismantled one state at a time and noting 
that ninety percent of those incarcerated are in state or local facilities). 
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if applied to a prisoner’s underlying conviction or sentence, would ren-
der it unconstitutional or at least constitutionally suspect? In the vast 
majority of cases, state prisoners already serving their sentences are 
unable to obtain relief from the federal courts, even when they remain 
incarcerated as a result of undisputed constitutional violations.   
1.   Retroactivity in the Warren Court 
 This was not always the case.19 But as the constitutional rights of 
criminal defendants expanded, along with the willingness of federal 
courts to reverse state convictions on habeas review, automatic retro-
active application of new judicial rules was retracted during the War-
ren Court.20 Under the much-criticized Linkletter/Stovall regime, the 
availability of retroactive relief or a newly announced criminal rule, 
whether on direct or collateral review, turned on case-by-case retroac-
tivity determinations.21 These ad hoc retroactivity decisions reflected 
the struggles of a divided Court to deal with the practical effects of the 
criminal “rights revolution,” during a period when federal habeas 
courts played an active role in reviewing and overturning already final 
state convictions.22 Some have argued that the Court’s reluctance to 
allow retroactive remedies for already final convictions was precisely 
what provided the Court with the continued freedom to expand the 
constitutional rights available to criminal defendants.23 
 To “settle what has become a most troublesome question in the ad-
ministration of justice,” certiorari was granted in Linkletter to decide 
whether the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio24 applied 
                                                                                                                                        
 19. Until the retraction of retroactive relief by the Warren Court, a reaction to the ‘rights 
revolution’ and concern with the effect of the explosion of new procedural rights on undoing 
already-final convictions, the default regime was that judicial decisions “had retrospective op-
eration for near a thousand years.” Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910).  
 20. ‘Warren Court’ refers to the Supreme Court decisions between 1953 and 1969, when Earl 
Warren was Chief Justice. See History of the Court, SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 
http://supremecourthistory.org/timeline_court_warren.html [https://perma.cc/V5HN-7UD7]. 
 21. The retroactivity regime for judge-made law in civil cases evolved separately and is 
not the subject of this Article. Discussions can be found in Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and 
Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055 (1997) and Harold J. 
Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. 
L.J. 2143 (1996).   
 22. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953) (announcing a de novo standard of review 
of legal questions on federal habeas); see also Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Habeas as Forum 
Allocation: A New Synthesis, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 645 (2017) (describing the evolution of the 
Brown v. Allen standard and its role in shifting de novo habeas review from the Supreme 
Court to the lower federal courts). 
 23. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-retroactivity, 
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1734 (1991); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The 
Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 99 (1999). 
 24. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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retroactively to cases decided before Mapp.25 After first declaring that 
the Constitution had nothing to say about retroactivity one way or the 
other,26 Linkletter held that to determine the retroactivity of a given 
criminal rule, the Court must “weigh the merits and demerits in each 
case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose 
and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard 
its operation.”27 This is not very clear guidance, to say the least. The 
exclusionary rule did not apply retroactively to litigants other than 
Mapp himself, the Court ruled, because to do so would “tax the admin-
istration of justice to the utmost.”28 The Court further justified this 
outcome by noting that “the fairness of the trial [was] not under at-
tack,” only “the admissibility of evidence, the reliability and relevancy 
of which is not questioned . . . .”29  
 In Stovall v. Denno,30 the Court refined the Linkletter analysis.31  
The retroactivity regime that governed thereafter for criminal 
judge-made rules was based on three fairly subjective and policy-
laden criteria, which applied to direct appeals and habeas cases 
alike: “[1] the purpose to be served by the new [rule], [2] the extent 
of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old [rule], and 
[3] the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive appli-
cation of the new [rule].”32   
 Over time, Justice Harlan refined a dissenting view, arguing that 
application of the three-part test was unpredictable and yielded incon-
sistent results.33 He insisted that “ ‘retroactivity’ must be rethought.”34 
And so it was.  
                                                                                                                                        
 25. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 620 (1965). 
 26. Id. at 629. 
 27. Id.   
 28. Id. at 637. 
 29. Id. at 639. This unwillingness to enforce the exclusionary rule continued. E.g., Stone 
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (finding no federal habeas remedy for Fourth  
Amendment violations). 
 30. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
 31. Id. at 300 (refusing to apply retroactively the rule announced in Wade v. United States, 
358 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1966), regarding the pre-trial right to counsel under this approach). 
 32. Id. at 297. 
 33. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in Desist argued against purely prospective application of new rules (while making an 
exception only for the litigant at bar) and also began advocating for non-retroactivity as the 
general rule in collateral proceedings, without “pretend[ing] to have exhausted . . . all the com-
plexities of the retroactivity problem on habeas.” Id. at 258, 268. His later opinion in Mackey 
v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971), elaborated on his reasons for why direct review cases 
required full retroactivity, while habeas cases used a more circumscribed approach. See 
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 675-702 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 34. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258.   
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2.   The Current Federal Regime: Complete Retroactivity for Di-
rect Appeals and General Non-Retroactivity for Collateral Review 
 In 1987, the Court began its incremental move towards adopting 
Justice Harlan’s proposed approach. Griffith v. Kentucky35 set the 
still-governing standard for cases on direct review: New criminal rules 
apply to all litigants whose convictions were not yet final at the time 
the new rule was announced, such that similarly situated defendants 
were treated similarly.36 Seemingly disavowing its view in Linkletter 
that retroactivity was not constitutionally mandated, the Court as-
serted, without further explanation, that a failure to apply a newly 
declared constitutional rule to similarly situated defendants whose 
cases were on direct appeal “violates basic norms of constitutional ad-
judication.”37 
 As for cases already final and reviewable only through post-convic-
tion proceedings, the other shoe of Justice Harlan’s approach to retro-
activity dropped two years later.  In 1989, Teague v. Lane announced 
the general rule that “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure 
will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before 
the new rules are announced.”38 Since Teague, state prisoners whose 
convictions have become final are extremely unlikely to obtain relief 
from criminal procedural rules that were announced in decisions 
which post-date their convictions.39 Teague also had the effect of freez-
ing the development of constitutional law for criminal defendants by 
holding that federal habeas courts had to rule on retroactivity as a 
threshold issue and could not reach the merits once it was determined 
that no retroactive relief was available.40 Timing is now everything. 
                                                                                                                                        
 35. 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
 36. Id. at 328. 
 37. Id. at 322.   
 38. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). The Teague regime largely adopted the retroactivity rules 
that Justice Harlan had advocated for in his separate opinions in the Mackey and Desist 
cases decided under the Linkletter/Stovall regime. Id. at 304-07. For general background on 
retroactivity rules and theories of judging, see, for example, Fisch, supra note 21 and Mat-
thew P. Harrington, Foreword: The Dual Dichotomy of Retroactive Lawmaking, 3 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 19 (1997). See also Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the 
Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 57-58 (1965) (advo-
cating for the approach urged by Justice Harlan and ultimately fully adopted in Teague).  
 39. See generally Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane 
Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, and the Perversity 
of the Court’s Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. REV. 161 (2005); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 23; see also 
Ezra D. Landes, A New Approach to Overcoming the Insurmountable “Watershed Rule” Ex-
ception to Teague’s Collateral Review Killer, 74 MO. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2009). 
 40. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300-01; see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 23, at 1746; James 
S. Liebman, More Than “Slightly Retro:” The Rehnquist Court’s Rout of Habeas Corpus Ju-
risdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 537, 567-76 (1991). 
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 This rethinking of retroactivity, however, did not resolve the prob-
lem of inconsistent results that plagued the Linkletter/Stovall regime. 
It just created a different set of problems. To be sure, inconsistencies 
no longer hinge so blatantly on a reviewing court’s policy-based deci-
sion as to whether anyone but the defendant at bar should benefit from 
the new rule. Now, the vagaries of timing, differences in lawyering 
skills, and duration of state procedures control. For two people con-
victed of the same crime on the same day, under procedures later re-
vealed as unconstitutional, the availability of relief from a federal 
court turns on whether they can claim the benefit of the new rule be-
fore their convictions become final.41 Thus, the longer your appeal 
takes, the more likely you are to benefit from a favorable change in the 
law. And, the Teague categories are arguably just as fuzzy as the Lin-
kletter/Stovall three-factor test. Under Teague, courts apply extremely 
malleable classifications that have evolved over the years to shrink the 
possibilities of federal habeas relief.   
 But before explaining how Teague operates, a few words on its un-
derlying premises are in order. Underpinning the general rule against 
collateral retroactivity advocated by Justice Harlan and legal scholars 
of the time, like Professors Mishkin and Bater, and adopted by Teague, 
were principles of comity—or deference to state courts—and a reluc-
tance to second-guess or disturb state convictions that were “correct,” 
i.e., applied the then-governing constitutional doctrine, at the time 
they were originally made.42 This foundation reflects an inherently 
crabbed view of the underlying purposes of habeas corpus relief, which 
is to assure that courts of first instance follow the right rules (rather 
than ensure that they get the right result), such that habeas courts 
“need only apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at the 
time the original proceedings took place” in order to fairly exercise 
their function of deterring state procedural violations.43 As long as 
state courts ‘toed the line,’ it did not matter if the line they were toeing 
was later revealed to have been poorly drawn. Scholars at the time 
went so far as to argue that federal plenary review was demoralizing 
to state court judges.44 Likewise, underpinning the Teague regime is 
                                                                                                                                        
 41. See Entzeroth, supra note 39, at 161-62. 
 42. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 23, at 1746-49 (discussing the evolution of the 
Teague rule and its underlying premises); Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Ret-
roactivity, or “Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give 
Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Pro-
ceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 25-27 (2009); Liebman, supra note 40, at 603-04.   
 43. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (quoting Justice Harlan’s dissent in Desist v. United States, 
394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969)). 
 44. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Pris-
oners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 451 (1963) (“I could imagine nothing more subversive of a 
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an overriding concern for protecting the finality of criminal judgments 
as an end wholly apart from federalism concerns, but especially be-
cause of a reluctance to impose greater costs on states by disturbing 
already settled judgments.45    
 Under Teague, the first step in the analysis is to decide whether a 
rule is “new” or not, as the retroactivity of the Court’s criminal proce-
dure decisions “turn[s] on whether they are novel.”46 If a habeas peti-
tioner can convince a court that the newly announced decision does not 
create a new rule at all, but rather is merely an application of an ex-
isting rule, then there is no retroactivity problem. Over the years, how-
ever, the Court has expanded its framing of what constitutes a new 
rule, making it increasingly difficult to argue that a case is simply ap-
plying an existing framework to new facts.47   
 The next escape route from Teague’s general prohibition on retro-
active relief is to argue that the rule is substantive rather than proce-
dural, meaning it “places ‘certain kinds of primary, private individual 
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to pro-
scribe.’ ”48 This rarely happens, and examples of substantive ‘excep-
tions’ to Teague’s bar on retroactive application of new criminal proce-
dural rules have, at least until the recent rulings in Montgomery and 
Welch, been few and far between.49  
                                                                                                                                        
judge’s sense of responsibility, of the inner subjective conscientiousness which is so essential 
a part of the difficult and subtle art of judging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of the 
notion that all the shots will always be called by someone else.”). 
 45. Teague, 489 U.S. at 309-10. 
 46. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013). 
 47. “ ‘[A] case announces a new rule . . . when it breaks new ground or imposes a new 
obligation’ on the government” and when “the result was not dictated by precedent existing 
at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301). 
After Teague, the Court further expanded the range of a new rule, explaining that a holding 
is not dictated by precedent unless it would have been “apparent to all reasonable jurists.” 
Id. (quoting Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1997)). In another formulation, the 
Court has stated that, to decide whether a rule is new, the question is “whether a state court 
considering [the defendant’s] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt 
compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the 
Constitution.” Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990). 
 48. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Substantive rules “decriminalize a 
class of conduct [or] prohibit the imposition of . . . punishment on a particular class of per-
sons.” Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495.    
 49. While courts and scholars sometimes refer to the retroactivity of substantive rules 
on collateral relief as an exception to the Teague retroactivity bar, in Bousley v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998), the Court explained that “Teague by its terms applies only 
to procedural rules,” (redefining element of a crime substantive rule that is retroactive). In-
deed, well before Teague, the Court had recognized the principal that an intervening change 
in substantive law requires retroactive application on collateral appeal. See Davis v. United 
States, 417 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1974); see also Ethan Isaac Jacobs, Note, Is Ring Retroactive?, 
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 Finally, the last way out of the Teague bar, one that has never been 
satisfied in federal court (even in the capital sentencing context), per-
mits retroactive application of “those procedures that . . . are ‘implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty,’ ”50 and that announce a “ ‘watershed 
rule[] of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and 
accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”51 Although the Supreme Court 
has yet to find a new procedural rule to be watershed, and has in fact 
strongly suggested that it may never do so,52 it has observed in dicta 
that Gideon v. Wainwright53 would probably qualify if decided today.54 
Criticisms of the Court’s steadfast refusal to ever conclude that a new 
rule satisfies this exception are deserved and many.55 Given the 
Court’s failure to find any new procedural rules sufficiently fundamen-
tal to qualify for retroactive effect, even those that constitute struc-
tural error and are automatic grounds for reversal on direct appeal, 
the Teague regime is perhaps best described as allowing only new sub-
stantive rules retroactive effect in federal collateral proceedings.56 
 In sum, the norm under Teague is that state prisoners serving al-
ready final sentences will, more often than not, find no recourse from 
                                                                                                                                        
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1806, 1820 (2003). Prohibitions on executions of classes of defend-
ants announced in decisions such as Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (no death 
penalty for child rape), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (no death penalty for juve-
niles), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (no death penalty for the mentally re-
tarded) would also count as substantive rules not barred by the Teague non-retroactivity 
regime. This past Term the Court declared two other rules to be substantive, and therefore, 
not barred by Teague. See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016); Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).  
 50. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part)). 
 51. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311). Supreme Court cases 
denying state habeas petitioners the benefit of new procedural rules are numerous and 
troubling in that they display the Court’s willingness to deny a remedy to people, including 
people on death row, whose convictions or sentences are constitutionally suspect. See, e.g., 
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1103 (holding the Sixth Amendment violation for IAC in Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), did not apply retroactively); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 
406, 421 (2007) (denying retroactive remedy for confrontation clause Sixth Amendment 
rights announced in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) for the same reasons); 
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 355-58 (2004) (declining to give retroactive relief on 
federal habeas review to a state death row prisoner because the constitutional rule an-
nounced in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)—that aggravating factors in a death sen-
tencing case had to be proved to a jury not a judge—was a new procedural rule that was 
not “watershed”).  
 52. See Whorton, 549 U.S. at 417-18.  
 53. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 54. Whorton, 549 U.S. at 419 (stating that Gideon is “the only case that we have iden-
tified as qualifying under this exception . . . .”); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART 
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1298 (7th ed. 2015). 
 55. See supra note 37.   
 56. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 54, at 1299. 
64  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:53 
   
federal habeas courts when constitutional rules change in their favor. 
Their federal rights will not be vindicated although governing consti-
tutional decisions show they have been imprisoned based on unconsti-
tutional procedures, even when they are serving sentences that are 
constitutionally suspect, including death sentences or mandatory sen-
tences that were imposed under sentencing regimes now recognized  
as unconstitutional.   
3.   Is Teague Even Necessary After AEDPA? 
 Teague remains a barrier to federal habeas relief, even though 
many of the comity and finality concerns that originally motivated its 
imposition of a general non-retroactivity rule for federal habeas pro-
ceedings have subsequently been addressed by what has been dubbed 
as “surely one of the worst statutes ever passed by Congress and 
signed into law by a President,”57 the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).58 The finality concerns that un-
derpinned Teague, for example, are largely ameliorated by the com-
bined effect of a one-year statute of limitations for the filing of federal 
habeas petitions that can be equitably tolled only in the most extraor-
dinary of circumstances,59 AEDPA’s own anti-retroactivity rules, 60 
and a prohibition of nearly all second or successive habeas petitions.61   
 Any reluctance to second-guess state court judgments that Teague 
addressed through an unyielding bar on collateral retroactive relief for 
                                                                                                                                        
 57. Lincoln Caplan, The Destruction of Defendants’ Rights, NEW YORKER  
(June 21, 2015), http://www newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-destruction-of-defendants-rights 
[https://perma.cc/9V3F-7FJC].    
 58. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012)).  
 59. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012); see also McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 
(2013) (holding that actual innocence can serve as a gateway to pass through expiration of 
statute of limitations); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (allowing equitable tolling). 
Federal prisoners who file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion seeking to take 
advantage of a new rule of constitutional law will thus usually be time-barred, except in 
those rare cases where the Supreme Court “announces a new rule of constitutional law and 
makes it retroactive within one year.” Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (em-
phasis added). State prisoners face this same result. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C)  
(2012); § 2244(b)(2)(A); Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 591 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Ryan 
W. Scott, In Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences on Collateral Review, 4 WAKE 
FOREST J. OF L. & POL’Y 179, 188 nn.37-40 (2014) (describing all the finality-saving devices 
of AEDPA, other than retroactivity restrictions). 
 60. Relief is available only for state court rulings “contrary to or involv[ing] an unrea-
sonable application of clearly established . . . law.” § 2254(d)(1). 
 61. Still unresolved by the Court is whether AEDPA fully codifies Teague, including the 
Teague exceptions, see Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 n.* (2011), and whether Teague 
even applies to federal prisoners seeking habeas relief under AEDPA § 2255, an argument 
that the Chaidez court declined to address. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 
1113 n.16 (2013). As discussed more fully below, if AEDPA in fact supplants Teague entirely, 
including nullifying the Teague exceptions, that is all the more reason for state courts to 
hear claims which constitutionally require review and would otherwise have no forum. 
2016]  FEDERALIZING RETROACTIVITY RULES 65 
   
 
 
criminal procedural rules is now more directly satisfied by AEDPA’s 
extreme deference to state courts’ rulings. AEDPA replaced the  Brown 
v. Allen62 regime, under which federal habeas courts reviewed ques-
tions of law de novo, with a rule that federal courts reviewing state 
court convictions must let even constitutionally erroneous rulings 
stand so long as those rulings are not objectively unreasonable.63 
AEDPA requires that “[a] state court . . . be granted a deference and 
latitude that are not in operation” in the circumstances of normal ap-
pellate review.64 Such extreme deference all but abdicates the review 
function of the federal judiciary, because asking whether a state 
court’s application of a legal standard is unreasonable is a far cry from 
asking whether that standard was correctly applied. Even worse, fed-
eral habeas petitioners can find themselves between a rock and a hard 
place in navigating around barriers to relief: for example, in seeking 
to escape the Teague bar by arguing that a constitutional holding is 
simply an application of already settled law, and not new, they may 
then find themselves blocked by the statute of limitations.65 
 In short, AEDPA has tied the hands of the federal judiciary, imped-
ing them from correcting constitutional error, and leaving countless 
state prisoners incarcerated or permitting their execution even when 
state courts make constitutional errors in their convictions or sen-
tences while applying the law at the time the decision was made. If 
deemed not “unreasonable,” constitutionally wrong decisions are left 
standing.66 As Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit has observed, this 
“collapse of habeas corpus as a remedy for even the most glaring of 
constitutional violations ranks among the greater wrongs of our legal 
era.”67 In the service of the hallowed and frequently hollow interests of 
comity and finality, the federal courts’ power to vindicate federal 
                                                                                                                                        
 62. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
 63. See generally Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (discussing the standard of 
review of state court judgments under § 2254(d)(2)). Under AEDPA, federal judges sitting in 
habeas may not grant relief “unless the [state court’s] adjudication of the claim . . . resulted 
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or . . . based 
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). 
 64. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). In Harrington, the Court held that 
federal habeas courts must defer to even unexplained state summary dispositions, reversing 
the Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief in an IAC claim. Id. at 113. 
 65. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 
(2013) (No. 11-820). 
 66. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 379.   
 67. Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Im-
munity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of 
Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 
1219, 1219 (2015).   
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rights through operation of the ‘Great Writ’ has all but disappeared. 
State courts can, and in some instances, arguably must step in to fill 
the void. The Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Danforth v. Minnesota 
provided one means for them to do so. 
B.   The Unrealized Promise of Danforth v. Minnesota 
1.   Federal Retroactivity as a Floor, Not a Ceiling 
 Against this bleak landscape of the incredibly shrinking federal ha-
beas remedy, a tiny glimmer of hope emerged in 2008. In a ruling that 
surprised many at the time, the Supreme Court in Danforth v. Minne-
sota68 pronounced that Teague’s retroactivity rule was a remedial (and 
therefore procedural) regime governing the availability of federal ha-
beas relief and not a substantive federal choice of law rule that deter-
mines—in a manner binding upon state courts—the moment when 
new constitutional rights emerge.69 In other words, Danforth returned 
to a ‘Blackstonian’ view of the world, where the proper interpretation 
of the Constitution was discovered, not made, and the retroactivity 
question boils down to whether or not a remedy should be available 
when the correct rule is found.70   
 While preserving, and arguably entrenching the Teague remedial 
framework for federal habeas courts, the Danforth majority released 
the state courts from any wrongly perceived obligation to adhere to 
Teague’s crabbed vision of the general unavailability of retroactive re-
lief during collateral proceedings. As a result of this unraveling of the 
constitutional rule from the retroactive remedy, state courts are now 
free to provide post-conviction remedies to state prisoners in their own 
courts based on ‘new’ federal rules, even when the federal courts are 
barred from doing so under Teague.  
 Danforth arose when the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to ap-
ply Crawford’s Confrontation Clause holding retroactively in state 
post-conviction proceedings, deeming itself bound by the Teague 
framework.71 In 1996, Stephen Danforth was convicted in Minnesota 
                                                                                                                                        
 68. 552 U.S. 264 (2008).   
 69. Id. at 288. 
 70. For a discussion of Danforth’s return to Blackstonian views of lawmaking (as op-
posed to legal realists’ recognition that judges make the law in response to changing circum-
stances), see, for example, Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 23, at 1734-58; Lasch, supra note 
42, at 46-47; The Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 276, 431-35 (2008); and 
Michael C. Dorf, Did Justice Stevens Pull a Fast One? The Hidden Logic of a Recent Retro-
activity Case in the Supreme Court, FINDLAW (Feb. 25, 2008), http://supreme.findlaw.com/ 
legal-commentary/did-justice-stevens-pull-a-fast-one-the-hidden-logic-of-a-recent-
retroactivity-case-in-the-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/JZD7-6CRR]. 
 71. Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 455-56 (Minn. 2006). 
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state court of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a child. In se-
curing the conviction, the prosecutor relied on a videotaped interview 
of the non-testifying victim.72 It was only in 2004, after Danforth’s con-
viction became final, that the United States Supreme Court decided 
Crawford v. Washington,73 holding that the Confrontation Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment prohibits the admission of testimonial, out-of-
court statements unless the defendant has been able to cross-examine 
the speaker.74 
 Danforth sought relief under Crawford in state habeas proceed-
ings.75 In denying post-conviction relief, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
concluded that even if the rule announced in Crawford were violated 
in his trial, Danforth had no recourse because the state court was 
bound to apply Teague.76 Under Teague, Crawford was a new criminal 
procedural rule that was not watershed, and therefore, unavailable to 
a petitioner seeking retroactive relief in collateral proceedings.77   
 Stephen Danforth petitioned the United States Supreme Court for 
certiorari, challenging the position of Minnesota’s highest court that it 
was bound under federal law to apply Teague’s retroactivity frame-
work.78 And although Minnesota refused to join issue on this question 
in its opposition to certiorari,79 the Supreme Court asked for supple-
mental briefing at the certiorari stage––a very rare occurrence signal-
ing a strong interest––and eventually granted certiorari on the ques-
tion of whether state courts were bound to apply the Teague frame-
work in their own post-conviction proceedings.80 The grant of certiorari 
was far from surprising, both because of the strong signal from the 
unusual supplemental briefing request, and most significantly, be-
cause at the time the states were deeply divided on the question.81 
                                                                                                                                        
 72. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 267.   
 73. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 74. Id. at 68-69. 
 75. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 267. 
 76. Danforth, 718 N.W.2d at 457. 
 77. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 267-68. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s view of Crawford’s 
non-retroactivity under Teague was consistent with that subsequently announced by the 
Supreme Court in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 421 (2007). 
 78. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Danforth, 552 U.S. 264 (No. 06-8273). 
 79. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Danforth, 552 U.S. 264 (No. 06-8273). 
 80. See Supplemental Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, 
Danforth, 552 U.S. 264 (No. 06-8273) (describing the letter from the Court requesting a  
supplemental briefing).  
 81. See, e.g., Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane 
on State Postconviction Remedies, 44 ALA. L. REV. 421, 437-48 (1993); see also Jason Maz-
zone, Rights and Remedies in State Habeas Proceedings, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1749, 1752-57 
(2011) (describing the various state retroactivity regimes pre-Danforth). 
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 The resulting 7-2 decision in Danforth was authored by Justice Ste-
vens; Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justice Kennedy.82 Af-
ter marching through the tortured history of retroactivity doctrine, the 
majority opinion pronounced the retroactivity question to be one of 
remedy alone, declaring that “the remedy a state court chooses to pro-
vide its citizens for violations of the Federal Constitution is primarily 
a question of state law.”83 Moreover, the Teague retroactivity bar was 
inapposite, Justice Stevens confirmed, because “Teague speaks only to 
the context of federal habeas,”84 and “was fashioned to achieve the 
goals of federal habeas while minimizing federal intrusion into state 
criminal proceedings. . . . not to limit a state court’s authority to grant 
relief for violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing 
its own State’s convictions.”85 
 In a fairly dramatic reframing of retroactivity doctrine, moving 
away from the realist recognition of the Warren era that the Court was 
‘making’ new law and returning to Blackstone’s ‘declaratory’ theory of 
judging, the majority opinion invoked the Blackstonian model as a 
means of making the “shift from ‘retroactivity’ to ‘redressability.’ ”86 By 
casting the question of retroactivity as purely one of remedy, states 
were free to follow their own procedures in determining whether and 
when collateral relief should be available and were not bound by 
Teague’s constricted framework, which was predicated in large part on 
inapposite principles of comity and deference to state courts.87 
 Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justice Kennedy.88 The 
dissent bemoaned the loss of federal supremacy and uniformity and 
decried the majority’s relinquishment of the Court’s “role under the 
Constitution as the final arbiter of federal law, both as to its meaning 
                                                                                                                                        
 82. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 265. 
 83. Id. at 288. 
 84. Id. at 281. 
 85. Id. at 280-81.   
 86. Lasch, supra note 42, at 35.    
 87. Teague in no way “constrains the authority of state courts to give broader effect to 
new rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion.” Danforth, 552 U.S. at 266. 
As noted above, the Court took pains to reserve the question of whether “States are required 
to apply ‘watershed’ rules in state post-conviction proceedings.” Id. at 269 n.4. As there have 
yet to be any watershed rules (with the exception of the post-hoc anointed Gideon v. Wain-
wright), this reservation was a bit like saying we do not decide whether the States can collect 
the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. This same footnote also reserved the question of 
whether Teague applies to federal prisoners and whether Congress can repeal the Teague 
exceptions by statute. Both questions are still open as Montgomery v. Louisiana held only 
that substantive rules must be applied retroactively by state and federal courts alike; it did 
not address the null set of watershed procedural rules. Recall that the Court has yet to de-
clare any procedural rule sufficiently watershed to be retroactive. See supra notes 50-54 and 
accompanying text.  
 88. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 291-311 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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and its reach, and the accompanying duty to ensure the uniformity of 
that federal law.”89 But this lament at lost uniformity rings hollow, as 
federal habeas rarely yields the same result to similarly situated de-
fendants across the country. As noted above, vagaries in the timing of 
state appellate and collateral review processes as well as differences 
in other state procedures, including those governing procedural de-
fault, already destroy the uniformity of results in federal habeas.90     
 The Danforth dissent also planted the seed of buyers’ remorse, not-
ing that if states are allowed more flexibility to be generous, they 
should be allowed equal flexibility to deny relief even in the rare cir-
cumstances where a federal court would apply a new rule retroac-
tively.91 But this past term, in Montgomery v. Louisiana,92 Justice 
Kennedy wrote for a majority that included Chief Justice Roberts and 
held that Danforth’s flexibility was one-way only: state courts are re-
quired to give retroactive effect to new federal substantive rules.93 In 
other words, federal retroactivity rules now establish a floor, not a ceil-
ing: states may be more generous than federal courts in providing ret-
roactive relief, but they may not be stingier. 
2.   Danforth’s Unrealized Promise 
 Commentators writing in the wake of the Danforth decision recog-
nized that giving states greater freedom to remedy constitutional vio-
lations in post-conviction proceedings held promise for state prisoners, 
providing an alternative forum to obtain relief that would otherwise 
be denied by federal habeas courts under Teague.94 But the results of 
                                                                                                                                        
 89. Id. at 310.   
 90. Federal courts require exhaustion of state procedures and will not reach the merits 
if a habeas petitioner procedurally defaults. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 
(1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).  
 91. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 309-10 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“I do not see any basis in 
the majority’s logic for concluding that States are free to hold our decisions retroactive when 
we have held they are not, but not free to hold that they are not when we have held  
they are.”). 
 92. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
 93. Id. at 729. In doing so, the majority found itself in the odd position of having to rule 
on the merits of the question presented in order to justify its own exercise of jurisdiction. In 
order to defend its exercise of jurisdiction, it had to first find that the Miller rule was substan-
tive, not procedural, and also decide that the retroactivity of substantive rules was a binding 
question of federal law, not a state-controlled remedial question. That unusual jurisdictional 
pivot is more fully addressed elsewhere. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, The 
Constitutional Right to Collateral Post-Conviction Review, 103 VA. L. REV. 905 (2017). 
 94. See e.g., Tom Cummins, Danforth v. Minnesota: The Confrontation Clause, Retro-
activity, and Federalism, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 255 (2009); Dorf, supra note 70; Lasch, 
supra note 42; Leading Cases, supra note 70, at 433-34 (arguing that Danforth’s remedial 
focus potentially weakens the Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) absolute rule of full 
retroactivity on direct review, because balancing is always appropriate in a remedial model); 
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a fifty-state survey are disappointing, showing that Danforth’s prom-
ise remains largely unrealized.95   
 Teague holds sway despite Danforth’s recognition that the Teague 
rule is grounded in comity concerns of federal habeas courts—concerns 
with no bearing in state court post-conviction proceedings where a sep-
arate sovereign is operating in its own sphere and has plenary author-
ity. Teague strangely remains the default rule in most states, perhaps 
in even more than before Danforth was decided. Teague’s cancer, in 
other words, has metastasized. Whether employed as a non-binding 
standard that is nonetheless woodenly applied, the starting place that 
ends up as an anchor weighing down any independent analysis (think 
of the anchoring effect of ‘advisory’ federal sentencing guidelines),96 or 
an unthinking rule of thumb, Teague, a decision based on the unique 
vision of the deferential role of federal habeas, is now coin of the realm. 
 The trajectory of Stephen Danforth’s own case proves as much. On 
remand from the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Danforth, Minne-
sota, although offered the road to freedom, opted to stick with the 
Teague regime, finding it not to “be a perfect rule, but . . . preferable 
to the alternatives.”97 In doing so, the Minnesota Supreme Court rec-
ognized that Teague’s comity rationale had no bearing in state post-
conviction proceedings, but doubled down on Teague’s other stated 
goal of serving finality.98 A purported “bright line” to guide litigants 
was preferred to case-by-case assessment of the worth of retroactive 
relief, particularly given the perceived difficulties and cost of reopen-
ing stale state convictions.99 Other states have followed suit. For the 
vast majority of states, Teague bears in some way on the retroactivity 
analysis. Only in the smallest handful of states does Teague play no 
role whatsoever.100  
                                                                                                                                        
Ilya Somin, A Floor, Not a Ceiling: Federalism and Remedies for Violations of Constitutional 
Rights in Danforth v. Minnesota, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 365 (2008). 
 95. GULL Survey, supra note 14. Thanks again to Thanh Nguyen and the GULC law 
library research team of summer 2015 for their help with the initial research on this. 
 96. Nancy Gertner, Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing—Real or Imagined?, 28 
FED. SENT’G REP. 165, 165-66 (2016).   
 97. Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Minn. 2009); see also Zorislav R. Leyderman, 
Criminal Law: Minnesota Formally Adopts the Teague Retroactivity Standard for State Post-
Conviction Proceedings—Danforth v. State, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 297, 315-16 (2009). 
 98. Ironically, in defending the importance of the finality interest, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court quoted not only Justice Harlan, in Mackey, but also the Florida Supreme Court, 
even though Florida is one of the few jurisdictions that had chosen not to adopt Teague. See 
Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 498-99 (quoting Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980)).   
 99. Id. at 499.  
 100. Alaska, Florida, Missouri, Utah, and West Virginia. See supra note 15. Moreover, 
the trend has shifted towards rather than away from Teague—three states that explicitly 
declined to follow Teague in 1993, now use it as the default rule: New Jersey (State v. Gaitan, 
37 A.3d 1089, 1107 (N.J. 2012)); Oregon (Saldana-Ramirez v. State, 298 P.3d 59, 63 (Or. Ct. 
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 Several states even choose to voluntarily bind themselves to 
Teague, notwithstanding their acknowledgement of Danforth’s invita-
tion to unyoke themselves from the federal regime. Some states have 
done so based on the belief that it would be a “totally fruitless folly” to 
devise their own rule, given “the incredibly daunting task of creating 
an alternative and independent body of retroactivity doctrine in oppo-
sition to Teague v. Lane.”101 Other states bind themselves to Teague 
by inertia where lower courts are bound by pre-Danforth decisions, but 
the state’s highest court has yet to reconsider the issue post-
Danforth.102 Yet other states first apply Teague to assure themselves 
that federal law does not require retroactivity, using Teague to set a 
floor, and only after determining that federal law does not mandate 
retroactive relief, do they proceed to apply a separate state retroactiv-
ity regime to decide whether they nonetheless want to be more gener-
ous on state grounds.103 There are even states that go so far as to use 
Teague as a retroactivity rule not only for federal constitutional deci-
sions, but also to assess whether a retroactive remedy is available in 
post-conviction proceedings when state law changes.104 
 Most states use Teague as a nonbinding standard. In the words of 
the Idaho Supreme Court, they recognize that they are “not required 
to blindly follow [the Supreme Court’s] view of what constitutes a new 
rule or whether a new rule is a watershed rule,” and instead can “give 
retroactive effect to a rule of law,” using “independent judgment, based 
upon the . . . ‘uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-
standing jurisprudence.’ ”105 But even when states explicitly recognize 
Teague as non-binding, anchoring effects induce states to follow the 
Supreme Court’s lead in most cases. 
                                                                                                                                        
App. 2013)); and South Dakota (Siers v. Weber, 851 N.W.2d 731, 742-43 (S.D. 2014)). Com-
pare with the discussion of those three states in Hutton, supra note 81, at 462-64.   
 101. See Miller v. State, 53 A.3d 385, 396 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (declining to apply 
Padilla retroactively); see also People v. Tate, 352 P.3d 959 (Colo. 2015). 
 102. See, e.g., Drach v. Bruce, 136 P.3d 390 (Kan. 2006); Petition of State, 103 A.3d 227 
(N.H. 2014); State v. Alshaif, 724 S.E.2d 597 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012); Burleson v. Saffle, 46 P.3d 
150 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002); Pierce v. Wall, 941 A.2d 189 (R.I. 2008); State v. White, 944 
A.2d 203 (Vt. 2007); State v. Walker, 756 N.W.2d 809 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).  
 103. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court, in People v. Maxon when declining to 
apply Padilla retroactively, first took a Teague analysis to ensure that federal law did not 
require a retroactive remedy and then applied its own version of the Linkletter/Stovall test. 
759 N.W.2d 817, 820-22 (Mich. 2008). 
 104. E.g., Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151, 160 (Ky. 2009); Thompson v. State, 
625 A.2d 299, 300-01 (Me. 1993); Odegard v. State, 767 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). 
 105. Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d 61, 70 (Idaho 2010) (quoting State v. Donato, 20 P.3d 5, 
8 (Idaho 2001)); see also, e.g., Thiersaint v. Comm’r of Corr., 111 A.3d 829, 843 (Conn. 2015) 
(“[W]hile federal decisions applying Teague may be instructive, this court will not be bound 
by those decisions in any particular case, but will conduct an independent analysis and ap-
plication of Teague.”).                             
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 Several states that use Teague as a nonbinding starting point, how-
ever, treat it as a framework to be tweaked, rather than a roadmap to 
be strictly followed and explicitly state that they are applying Teague 
on their own terms. These states critique the Supreme Court for its 
ever-expanding understanding of what constitutes a new rule, or its 
crabbed definition of what constitutes a watershed rule of criminal 
procedure, or both. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, for example, 
held Padilla retroactive after the Supreme Court refused to do so in 
Chaidez, and in so doing, adopted an earlier variant of the Teague 
framework that existed before the Court broadened the definition of a 
‘new rule’ in the 1997 Lambrix decision to include whether it was “ap-
parent to all reasonable jurists.”106 “Although [it] consider[ed] the ret-
roactivity framework established in Teague to be sound in principle,” 
the Massachusetts court explained:  
[T]he Supreme Court’s post-Teague expansion of what qualifies as a 
“new” rule has become so broad that “decisions defining a constitu-
tional safeguard rarely merit application on collateral review. . . .” 
[W]e continue to adhere to the Supreme Court’s original construction 
that a case announces a “new” rule only when the result is “not dic-
tated by precedent.”107   
 In Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction,108 the Connecticut Su-
preme Court concluded that Miller v. Alabama109 was a watershed rule 
of criminal procedure. This determination of watershed importance 
was justified on the basis that the pre-Miller use of a mandatory sen-
tencing regime created too high a risk of a disproportionate punish-
ment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In contrast, allowing a 
sentencing judge full discretion yields the needed accuracy in sentenc-
ing procedures to avoid this risk.110 That Connecticut court also recog-
nized that the Miller rule did not fall easily into substantive or proce-
dural exceptions to Teague and that most state courts that had found 
Miller retroactive had categorized it as a substantive exception not-
withstanding its procedural elements.111 The Connecticut Supreme 
Court exercised its autonomy in announcing that Miller was a water-
                                                                                                                                        
 106. Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 995 N.E.2d 760, 769 (Mass. 2013) (quoting Lambrix v. 
Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1997)). 
 107. Id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989); Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463 
(Nev. 2003)).  
 108. 115 A.3d 1031 (Conn. 2015). 
 109. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 110. Casiano, 115 A.3d at 1041-42.   
 111. Id. at 1040.  
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shed procedural rule, even though the Teague procedural exception re-
mains a nullity under federal law.112 Missouri has also found the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona retroactive under its own 
retroactivity regime, and did so pre-Danforth.113 The year after the 
State v. Whitfield decision, the Supreme Court refused to give retroac-
tive effect to the same rule when applying Teague.114 
 Such maverick decisions, however, remain the exceptions that 
prove the rule. Given the heaviness of Teague’s shadow, it is much less 
likely for states to grant retroactive relief for a new federal rule after 
the Supreme Court has already denied retroactive relief under Teague. 
Whether or not the rule announced in Padilla v. Kentucky115 (that IAC 
claims can be brought during deportation proceedings) should be ret-
roactive is one example. Most states have, like the Supreme Court did 
in Chaidez, denied retroactivity to this decision, which expanded the 
scope of IAC claims to include bad advice on the deportation conse-
quences of a guilty plea.116 Only Massachusetts, while working within 
the Teague framework, broke from the Supreme Court’s narrow defi-
nition of a new rule to hold Padilla retroactive after Chaidez.117 Inter-
estingly, although many of these states decided the Padilla issue be-
fore the Supreme Court’s decision in Chaidez, the Chaidez court did 
not cite any of the state decisions (or distinguish those concluding Pa-
dilla should apply retroactively) in its reasoning.118  
                                                                                                                                        
 112. Id. at 1041.  
 113. See State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 269 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 114. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004).   
 115. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).  
 116. States denying retroactive relief for the rule announced in Padilla before the Supreme 
Court ruled in Chaidez include: Arizona (State v. Poblete, 260 P.3d 1102 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011)), 
Georgia (State v. Sosa, 733 S.E.2d 262 (Ga. 2012)), Michigan (People v. Gomez, 820 N.W.2d 217 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2012)), Minnesota (Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. 2012)), New Jersey 
(State v. Gaitan, 37 A.3d 1089 (N.J. 2012)), Oregon (Saldana-Ramirez v. State, 298 P.3d 59 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2013)), and Tennessee (Rodriguez v. State, No. M2011–02068–CCA–R3–PC, 2012 WL 
4470675 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2012)). New Mexico granted retroactive relief before the 
Supreme Court ruled in Chaidez in Ramirez v. State, 333 P.3d 240 (N.M. 2014). Other states, 
like Connecticut in Thiersaint v. Comm’r of Corr., 111 A.3d 829 (Conn. 2015); Nebraska, in 
State v. Osorio, 837 N.W.2d 66 (Neb. 2013); New York, in People v. Baret, 16 N.E.3d 1216 (N.Y. 
2014); Ohio, in State v. Bishop, 7 N.E.3d 605 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014); and Texas, in Ex parte De 
Los Reyes, 392 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) followed the Supreme Court’s lead in 
Chaidez in denying relief. The dissenting opinion in Baret criticizes the majority for declining 
to accept Danforth’s invitation, and “instead applying Teague in lock-step with the Supreme 
Court.” Baret, 16 N.E.3d at 1233; see also Kate Lebeaux, Note, Padilla Retroactivity on State 
Law Grounds, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1651 (2014). 
 117. Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 995 N.E.2d 760, 766 (Mass. 2013) (concluding that under 
its own application of the Teague exceptions, Padilla did not announce a new rule and was 
therefore retroactively applicable on collateral review).   
 118. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013). 
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 Similarly, before the Supreme Court finally resolved the issue in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana,119 the states were fairly evenly divided over 
whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of mandatory life with-
out parole for juveniles (the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama) 
should apply retroactively, and if so, why. Courts in eleven states had 
held that Miller is retroactively available in collateral proceedings, the 
majority concluding that it is a substantive rule.120 Although Connect-
icut, as detailed above, deemed it a Teague watershed exception.121 
Florida and Missouri concluded it was retroactive after applying their 
own variants of a Linkletter/Stovall three-part test.122 At least five 
states applying Teague denied retroactivity, deeming Miller a non-ret-
roactive procedural rule.123 When the Supreme Court finally stepped 
into the fray and resolved the issue with its decision in Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, it ruled in a form binding upon all state courts that Miller 
was a substantive rule requiring retroactive application.124 
 The case presented the opportunity for the Supreme Court (fore-
gone in Chaidez) to engage in a dialogue with the state courts on the 
Miller retroactivity analysis, a type of “polyphonic federalism” where 
the fact that the states had gotten ahead of the Supreme Court on the 
issue generated a more engaged debate.125   
                                                                                                                                        
 119. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
 120. See In re Willover, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015); People v. Morfin, 981 
N.E.2d 1010 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270 
(Mass. 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698 (Miss. 2013); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716 
(Neb. 2014); Petition of State, 103 A.3d 227 (N.H. 2014); Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572 (S.C. 
2014); Ex Parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 
487 (Wyo. 2014) (after applying Teague by the parties’ consent). As described in Robert S. 
Chang et al., Evading Miller, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 85, 95 (2016), some states have also 
resolved the issue legislatively by abolishing mandatory LWOP juvenile sentencing regimes 
and making that legislative fix retroactive. 
 121. Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1041 (Conn. 2015). 
 122. In Geter v. State, 115 So. 3d 375, 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), a district court of appeals 
in Florida declared Miller non-retroactive under that state’s standard. This decision is no longer 
good after Montgomery has been quashed. See Geter v. State, 177 So. 3d 1266 (Table) (Fla. 
2015). Missouri, in contrast, held Miller retroactive under its own retroactivity regime. Alt-
hough the reasoning is different than that of the Supreme Court in Montgomery, this decision 
can stand. See Branch v. Cassady, No. WD 77788, 2015 WL 160718 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 
2015). Some states have also resolved the issue legislatively by abolishing mandatory life with-
out parole (LWOP) juvenile sentencing regimes and making that legislative fix retroactive.     
 123. The following state courts held that the Miller rule was procedural and non-retro-
active, all decisions that are no longer good law under Montgomery v. Louisiana: Ex parte 
Williams, 183 So. 3d 220 (Ala. 2015); People v. Tate, 352 P.3d 959 (Colo. 2015); Chambers v. 
State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013); Beach v. State, 348 P.3d 629 (Mont. 2015); Common-
wealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013). 
 124. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016). 
 125. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 
243, 288 (2005) (arguing that overlap of state and federal power provides “a valuable oppor-
tunity for dialogue,” as can be seen, for example, in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (reversing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)), which 
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 In sum, the shadow of Teague looms disturbingly large in state 
court proceedings, notwithstanding Danforth’s invitation to cast aside 
this federal statute-specific limitation on the availability of a remedy 
for constitutional violations, a limitation that is grounded largely in 
inapposite comity concerns. The failure of state courts to unyoke them-
selves from Teague is understandable, perhaps given the difficulties of 
forging a new path. Whether legal rules are retroactive presents a com-
plicated question that has perplexed legal scholars for centuries, and 
generated scores of articles and conflicting Supreme Court decisions. 
Unthinking bright lines are easy to implement, and the seeming path 
of least resistance is to apply the same framework used by the  
federal courts. 
 But there are structural constitutional concerns at issue here that 
counsel strongly against following Teague. Basic principles of equity, 
social justice, and pragmatism, too, offer good reasons to eschew blind 
adherence to Teague given that much, if not all, of the underpinnings 
of that decision have no bearing in the context of state post-conviction 
proceedings. Under certain (if not all) circumstances, state habeas 
courts must provide relief precisely because federal habeas courts will 
not. Otherwise, litigants will lack any forum to vindicate their consti-
tutional rights, particularly for those claims that are not truly “final” 
until after at least one round of post-conviction proceedings.126   
 As Justice Anstead of the Supreme Court of Florida (one of the few 
states that chose not to follow Teague) has observed, as federal habeas 
protections dissolve, the more important the role of state post-convic-
tion review in the constitutional scheme becomes: 
It would make little sense for state courts to adopt the Teague anal-
ysis when a substantial part of Teague’s rationale is deference to a 
state’s substantive law and review. If anything, the more restrictive 
standards of federal review place increased and heightened im-
portance upon the quality and reliability of the state proceedings. 
In other words, if the state proceedings become the only real venue 
for relief, as they in fact have become, it is critically important that 
                                                                                                                                        
reflected on the diverse experience of state courts interpreting their own constitutions to 
forbid prohibiting homosexual sex); see also id. at 302-03 (discussing how Article III standing 
limits prevent vindication of federal rights in federal courts, but state courts are not so lim-
ited and provide an alternative forum for vindication of federal rights).    
 126. In doing so, it will be important to distinguish concepts of waiver and forfeiture, etc., 
in cases where there has been a voluntary relinquishment of the opportunity to fully and fairly 
litigate through litigation choices, from instances where the petitioner had no previous oppor-
tunity to raise the claim because it had not yet been discovered. Erica Hashimoto addresses 
this in her article on how the Teague bar is the only barrier to habeas relief not grounded in 
equity and proposes a substitute rule that sounds in equitable principles, taking account of 
waiver and forfeiture problems but providing retroactive relief otherwise. See Erica Hashimoto, 
Reclaiming the Equitable Heritage of Habeas, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 142 (2014). 
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the state courts provide that venue and “get it right” since those 
proceedings will usually be the final and only opportunity to litigate 
collateral claims. In fact, it is the presumed heightened quality of 
state proceedings that allows the federal courts to defer to the state 
proceedings as adequate safeguards to the rights of state prisoners. 
To then further restrict the state proceedings would undermine the 
entire rationale for restricting federal proceedings because of the re-
liability of state proceedings.127 
 Justice Anstead’s point that state courts have no warrant to blindly 
follow Teague is well taken, and echoes the basic logic that informs 
Danforth. But, it can be taken even further. As I argue below, the Su-
preme Court’s retroactivity decisions in Teague nonetheless matter a 
great deal in the state court analysis—not as a default regime to wood-
enly follow—but rather as a spur to action, an oppositional lodestar if 
you will. It is precisely when a claim is Teague-barred in federal ha-
beas that state courts should be prompted to more seriously consider 
relief, so as to ensure that at least one forum is available to vindicate 
constitutionally protected rights. A federal Teague bar, in other words, 
should serve not as a blindly followed restraint, but as a call to retro-
active action in state court.  
C.   Why State Courts Should (and Sometimes Must) Free Them-
selves from Teague’s Constraints 
 Henry M. Hart famously observed in 1953 that, “we really would be 
sunk,” if the state courts failed to fulfill their role in “the scheme of the 
Constitution . . . [as] the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, 
and in many cases . . . the ultimate ones,” in circumstances where 
“Congress ha[s] taken away the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
and been upheld in doing so.”128 The Supreme Court’s draconian en-
forcement of the Teague retroactivity bar, especially when combined 
with AEDPA’s piled-on restrictions of federal habeas review, arguably 
pose precisely such circumstances. State courts, in other words, just 
might have occasion to become “holier than the pope,”129 in providing 
post-conviction opportunities to review constitutional claims that 
would be otherwise barred by Teague in federal court. This is particu-
larly true for those claims that do not become truly final until after 
direct appeal is concluded, what I call here ‘initial collateral review 
                                                                                                                                        
 127. Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 863 (Fla. 2005). 
 128. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953).  
 129. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 154 (1970) (arguing that although state courts could in theory 
be more generous than federal courts in providing post-conviction relief, there was no need 
for them to be “holier than the pope”). 
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claims.’ Even apart from this class of claims where retroactivity in 
state collateral proceedings is required by structural constitutional 
concerns, there are compelling reasons that the default rule should be 
one of full retroactivity. Finality qua finality is an insufficient reason 
to deny retroactive relief when there are credible claims of constitu-
tional error resulting in a punishment greater than that authorized  
by law. 130 
1.   Circumstances Where State Habeas Courts Must Provide a 
Retroactive Remedy 
 My first claim is strong but narrow: in some circumstances, state 
courts not only can, but must, apply rules that the Supreme Court has 
deemed ‘new’ and thus ineligible for federal habeas relief retroactively. 
Failure to do so would violate Article III’s guarantee that at least one 
forum be provided for the full and fair vindication of a federal consti-
tutional right. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote long ago, “The very es-
sence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual 
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”131  
                                                                                                                                        
 130. The argument might be made that state court judges are less able to fairly vindicate 
constitutional rights than their federal counterparts, because federal judges are “as insu-
lated from majoritarian pressures as is functionally possible.” Burt Neuborne, The Myth of 
Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1127 (1977). But where, as here, they are also straitjacketed—
not only by the text of AEDPA itself, but by the Supreme Court’s ever-more crabbed inter-
pretations of that statute—state courts may provide the only available, and therefore pref-
erable, forum to afford constitutionally required relief. Although a majority of state courts 
have some form of electoral process to select their judges, see Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 
S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015), thirty-nine states, and judges in those states, are therefore arguably 
more subject to majoritarian pressures. State courts also remain the last resort for state 
prisoners to pursue (and develop) new constitutional claims in post-conviction proceedings, 
absent waiver of the Teague bar by the state defendant in federal habeas proceedings—a 
rare occurrence. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 289 (2008) (citing cases of Teague 
waivers). Such state court willingness to be more generous than their federal counterparts 
in providing relief is not unimaginable, particularly given the wave of reforms on the front 
end of resolving the mass incarceration crisis, including abolishing mandatory minimums 
and truth in sentencing laws (reforms that are supported by the right and left alike) and the 
recognized mass incarceration crisis. See, e.g., RAM SUBRAMANIAN & RUTH DELANEY, 
PLAYBOOK FOR CHANGE? STATES RECONSIDER MANDATORY SENTENCES, VERA INSTITUTE FOR 
JUSTICE (2014), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/mandatory-
sentences-policy-report-v2b.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CM8-J39Z]. It is conceivable that the 
winds have changed. Elected state court judges could arguably begin to face greater pressure 
to resist draconian sentencing regimes, and favor earlier release, particularly for those who 
are serving unconstitutional sentences or who have been convicted based on constitutional 
error. It may be that state jurists will be more generous in providing retroactive relief pre-
cisely because state legislators are also engaging in active “front-end” reforms to eliminate 
draconian mandatory sentencing schemes, for example. This issue can be addressed in future 
empirical work. 
 131. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
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 The rules that fall into this category are those like the ‘new’ inef-
fective assistance of counsel (IAC) rule announced in Padilla, which 
present claims that can only be fairly adjudicated for the first time 
after the case is “final”—that is, direct appeal is concluded. It is also 
possible to conceive of other sorts of claims that can be heard only in 
post-conviction proceedings—such as certain types of Brady claims 
involving prosecutorial misconduct on appeal or claims specifically 
related to abuse of appellate processes—that, if covered by proce-
dural rules confirmed only after the conviction, would be Teague-
barred in federal habeas courts. For such claims, state post-convic-
tion proceedings would stand as the only available forum to vindicate 
a federal constitutional right.132    
 Recent Supreme Court decisions like Martinez v. Ryan133 and Tre-
vino v. Thaler,134 for example, have made increasingly clear that IAC 
claims are ideally brought in post-conviction proceedings. And, as a 
practical matter, state post-conviction proceedings can only be brought 
after the direct appeal, typically handled by the original counsel of rec-
ord, is concluded.   
 In Martinez, the Court held that where IAC claims must be raised 
in an initial collateral proceeding under state law, a procedural default 
will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing those claims if, in the 
initial review of collateral proceedings, there was no counsel or counsel 
in that proceeding was ineffective.135 Put simply, defendants are enti-
tled to one fair shot to litigate IAC claims, and that fair shot is some-
times not possible until the direct appeal is over. 
 The Court reinforced this principle in Trevino, holding that where a 
state’s procedural framework makes it highly unlikely for a defendant 
to have a meaningful opportunity to raise on direct appeal a claim that 
his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, the good cause excep-
tion recognized in Martinez applies.136 Together, these cases suggest 
                                                                                                                                        
 132. Although the focus of this Article is the availability of relief for state prisoners 
through state post-conviction proceedings, especially when federal habeas relief is Teague-
barred, these arguments would apply with equal force to preclude Teague from barring relief 
to federal prisoners that, under the current regime, would similarly have no opportunity for 
full and fair litigation of certain types of IAC or other claims, in instances where the ‘new’ 
rule emerges after direct proceedings were finalized but before post-conviction proceedings 
have begun. The Supreme Court has explicitly left open whether the Teague retroactivity 
bar would apply in such a circumstance. In Chaidez, the petitioner argued that it should not, 
particularly for IAC claims that are ideally (or arguably, can only be) raised after direct 
appeal has been exhausted, but the Court declined to reach the question. Chaidez v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 n.16 (2013). 
 133. 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012). 
 134. 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013). 
 135. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.   
 136. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921; see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 508-09 
(2003) (holding that federal prisoners may bring IAC claims in habeas proceedings under § 2255 
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that for certain types of claims that are not truly final, meaning they 
have not had a full and fair process to be litigated on direct appeal,137 
the proper retroactivity rule should be that of Griffith v. Kentucky,138 
because litigants in such circumstances are similarly situated to liti-
gants whose direct appeals are still pending. “[B]asic norms of constitu-
tional adjudication”139 entitle them to their first bite at the apple.   
 Imagine a Padilla claim where a criminal defendant was improp-
erly advised about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, but 
the case became “final,” meaning direct appeal was concluded, before 
Padilla was decided. Under Teague, as applied to Padilla claims in 
Chaidez, there is no opportunity to bring a Sixth Amendment claim in 
federal habeas proceedings. And, although Danforth allows state 
courts to hear the claim in their post-conviction proceedings, as 
demonstrated above, the vast majority of states follow the Supreme 
Court’s lead in denying relief. The result (at least in the many states 
that follow the Supreme Court’s lead): a constitutional violation that 
has never been—and never even had the opportunity to be—fully and 
fairly litigated because post-conviction proceedings are the first prac-
tical opportunity to present such a claim. But failure to allow even a 
single opportunity to present a claim of constitutional injury is some-
thing that cannot be countenanced in a legal system that purports to 
be governed by a binding Constitution.140  
 Nor would earlier proponents of restrictions on habeas retroactiv-
ity, like Justice Harlan, think otherwise. Because such initial review 
collateral claims are not truly “final” until after post-conviction review 
has concluded, the more appropriate retroactivity rule is that of Grif-
fith v. Kentucky, one grounded in “basic norms of constitutional adju-
dication,” which demands that all cases pending for similarly situated 
                                                                                                                                        
whether or not the claim could have been raised on direct appeal, given that, collateral pro-
ceedings are the “forum best suited” for IAC claims for a variety of reasons); Rebecca Sharp-
less & Andrew Stanton, Teague New Rules Must Apply in Initial-Review Collateral Proceed-
ings: The Teachings of Padilla, Chaidez and Martinez, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 795 (2013) (mak-
ing this argument). 
 137. Justice Harlan’s memorable ode to finality, that “[n]o one, not criminal defendants, 
not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefitted by a judgment providing a man 
shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incar-
ceration shall be subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved,” Mackey v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 
hinges on the last two words: “already resolved.” 
 138. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987). 
 139. Id. at 322. 
 140. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
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litigants receive the benefit of the ‘new’ rule.141 The reasoning under-
pinning the finality and repose interests protected by Teague is, in 
short, utterly inapposite when the constitutionally injured party has 
not yet had an opportunity to litigate the claim.   
 Those who advocated for more stringent retroactivity regimes on 
habeas, in the context of the Warren Court’s criminal rights revolu-
tion, all started from the basic premise that the federal habeas peti-
tioner had already had at least one opportunity to fully and fairly liti-
gate his or her claim in state proceedings.142 These proponents of final-
ity recognized that reasonable jurists could and would disagree on a 
platonic ‘correct’ result, creating the possibility of unending review 
with no repose, as long as opportunities for challenge remained.143 
They therefore saw the goal of habeas not as error correction, but ra-
ther as assurance of adequacy of process—a view that is enshrined in 
AEDPA and today’s federal habeas jurisprudence.144  
 But such exaltation of process, above all else, hinges on the premise 
that some process has been offered. Cases such as Stone v. Powell145 
and Swaine v. Presley146 confirm that federal habeas relief can be de-
nied only when a full and fair alternative forum is truly available. And 
although state courts may not even be constitutionally required to hold 
                                                                                                                                        
 141. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322. Note too that this constitutionally mandated “equal treat-
ment” rule of Griffith could very easily be extended to mandate full retroactive availability 
of relief in collateral proceedings as well, given that it is only the vagaries of appellate prac-
tice that lead one person’s conviction to become final years before another’s, allowing two 
defendants—who committed an offense on the same day, or who plead guilty on the same 
day, or who were tried at the same time—to nonetheless not have the same resort to retro-
active relief. The defendant whose appeal process goes more slowly is able, even under 
Teague, to take advantage of a retroactive remedy (assuming the claim can be brought on 
direct appeal), while the defendant who is in state proceedings that move faster, or whose 
lawyer is more efficient, will be out of luck because her conviction becomes final before the 
new rule is announced.   
 142. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 44, at 443; Mishkin, supra note 38, at 57. 
 143. “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are 
final.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result). 
 144. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. 
 145. 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976) (holding that Fourth Amendment violations were not cog-
nizable in federal habeas proceedings where “the State has provided an opportunity for full 
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim”); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (proposing that the substantive scope of federal 
habeas jurisdiction for search-and-seizure claims be limited “solely to the question of 
whether the petitioner was provided a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the 
question in state courts”). 
 146. 430 U.S. 372, 383-84 (1977) (finding no § 2255 federal habeas review of District of 
Columbia criminal convictions given the availability of collateral proceedings in the District 
of Columbia and recognizing “the settled view that elected judges of our state courts are fully 
competent to decide federal constitutional issues,” and that “collateral relief available in the 
Superior Court is neither ineffective nor inadequate simply because the judges of that court 
do not have life tenure”). 
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post-conviction proceedings, or even appeals, once they do provide a 
forum, that forum must be fully available to vindicate federal rights.  
 It follows that where there has been no prior opportunity to litigate 
the federal claim in state proceedings on direct appeal, a habeas rem-
edy is constitutionally required. The finality line drawn in Griffith 
does not govern for these initial review, collateral claims. And if the 
federal courts are barred from review under Teague, given the arbi-
trary drawing of a finality line at the conclusion of direct appeal pro-
ceedings, even when the claim in question is not truly final, the state 
courts must step in.147   
 To be sure, instances where ‘new’ procedural rules barred by 
Teague can be heard only in post-conviction proceedings are likely 
rare. Until Chaidez so characterized the Padilla rule, there were over 
three decades of Supreme Court decisions addressing IAC claims,148 
yet the Supreme Court had never concluded that they created new 
rules. Instead the Court concluded that such claims involved applica-
tions of foreseeable evolution of settled doctrine.149 And to my 
knowledge, the Court has yet to hold that a case enforcing Brady’s pro-
hibition against prosecutorial misconduct constitutes a new rule that 
would be Teague-barred, versus an application of existing precedent.150 
                                                                                                                                        
 147. State courts may not even be constitutionally required to hold post-conviction pro-
ceedings, or even appeals, as found in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1987), 
although the ruling in Montgomery casts some doubt on that proposition. See Vazquez & 
Vladeck, supra note 93, at 910. In all events, it is settled law that once state courts do provide 
a forum, that forum must be available to vindicate federal rights. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 
330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (finding that the policy of the federal law is the prevailing policy in 
every state); Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 222-25 (1908) (finding relief for federal 
violations must be available in state court, especially when precluded by the Eleventh 
Amendment in federal court); see also Mondou v. N.Y., N.H. & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 56-
57 (1912) (“[W]e deem it well to observe that there is not here involved any attempt by Con-
gress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts or to control or affect their modes 
of procedure, but only a question of the duty of such a court, when its ordinary jurisdiction 
as prescribed by local laws is appropriate to the occasion and is invoked in conformity with 
those laws, to take cognizance of an action to enforce a right of civil recovery arising under 
the act of Congress and susceptible of adjudication according to the prevailing rules of pro-
cedure.”). Moreover, Vazquez and Vladeck, in their forthcoming piece on Montgomery v. Lou-
isiana, make the argument that the import of the Court’s decision is that state courts are 
now constitutionally required to provide post-conviction relief. See Vazquez & Vladeck, su-
pra note 93, at 937.  
 148. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 65; see Brief of Petitioner at 16, Chaidez 
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (No. 11-820). 
 149. This does not mean, of course, that such claims will necessarily prevail. Precisely 
because IAC claims are predicated on the already deferential Strickland standard, it is very 
difficult for a federal court, constrained by AEDPA deference, to reverse a state court on the 
merits. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 150. Note also that these claims are likely to present not only retroactivity problems, but 
statute of limitation problems where the question of untimeliness may or may not be resolved 
through AEDPA’s exceedingly narrow “newly discovered evidence” window—if they involve 
guilt. Brady sentencing claims, however, would have no recourse. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) 
82  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:53 
   
New rule problems, moreover, will ultimately time out: at some point 
any new rule becomes an old one as future cases come down the pike 
and new litigants are able to take advantage of already existing rules. 
Yet even if few and far between, when initial review collateral claims 
present themselves, there are solid arguments that state courts should 
follow the Griffith rule rather than the Teague rule. The reasoning be-
hind any opposing argument does not withstand scrutiny, given that 
it is predicated solely on finality interests that have no bearing.151   
 A solitary footnote in Greene v. Fisher, moreover, raises the specter 
of another class of cases where state courts would have the structural 
constitutional obligation to review claims that Congress has deprived 
the federal courts of habeas jurisdiction to review.152 There, Justice 
Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the Third Circuit’s de-
nial of federal habeas relief, holding that AEDPA’s deployment of the 
term “clearly established Federal law” is limited to the Supreme 
Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court adjudication 
on the merits, and not when the decision was truly final (with the ex-
piration of the period for seeking Supreme Court review from the di-
rect appeal).153 But the Court also noted that “[w]hether § 2254(d)(1) 
would bar a federal habeas petitioner from relying on a decision that 
came after the last state-court adjudication on the merits, but fell 
within one of the exceptions recognized in Teague . . . is a question we 
need not address to resolve this case.”154   
 If the Court were to hold that AEDPA effectively repealed the Teague 
exceptions (something I even hesitate to utter, like he-who-shall-not-be-
named, for fear of bringing the possibility to life), then state courts 
would be the only forum available to provide the due process protections 
that underpin the Teague exceptions themselves. Here too, state courts 
would be required to fulfill their role in the constitutional scheme as the 
‘ultimate guardians’ of constitutional rights.155   
                                                                                                                                        
(providing an AEDPA limitation on second and successive federal habeas claims against 
those who “establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would 
have found the movant guilty of the offense” which by its terms precludes sentencing claims). 
 151. See Giovanna Shay, The New State Postconviction, 46 AKRON L. REV. 473, 475 
(2013) (making a similar argument). 
 152. 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 n.* (2011). 
 153. Id. at 45; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This of course further illustrates the arbitrariness 
of setting a moment in time that determines whether a rule is new or old. See the opening 
example in Entzeroth, supra note 39.  
 154. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 44 n.*. Montgomery did not expressly address this open ques-
tion but strongly suggests that the answer is no. 
 155. See Hart, supra note 128, at 1401.     
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2.   Why State Habeas Courts Should Provide Retroactive Relief 
When a Claim Is Teague-Barred in Federal Court 
 My second proscriptive point is broader. I contend that state courts 
would be well advised to look to the Supreme Court’s Teague rulings 
not as a default rule to unquestioningly apply, but as a map of 
landmines that should be studied carefully so as to avoid further dam-
age. Recall that Teague is grounded on two fundamental concerns: 
comity and finality. As Danforth recognized (as do many state courts 
that rely on Teague), the comity interest that calls for deference to and 
respect for the decisions of co-equal sovereigns has no bearing where 
state courts exercise their role as independent sovereigns in evaluat-
ing the legality of continued detention of state prisoners.156 What state 
courts following Teague fail to recognize, however, is that Teague’s 
other main supporting principle—an interest in finality and repose, 
and a desire to avoid the disturbance or second-guessing of state court 
judgments for claims that have at least arguably been correctly de-
cided under the then-current law—is too slim a reed upon which to 
base unquestioned fealty to the Teague regime. Particularly, given 
Danforth’s recognition of the law-declaring function of federal 
courts,157 it is arguable that state court rulings under the ‘old’ rule 
were never correctly decided.158 
 In short, even if not constitutionally required to do so, state courts 
should avoid rote application of the Teague retroactivity bar. Comity 
concerns are nonexistent when a sovereign is reviewing its own judg-
ments, and finality interests are overrated, particularly in an era 
where mass incarceration rates are ever more subject to criticism. 
State jurists need to take an exceptionally hard look at the touted fi-
nality interests that undergird Teague—a decision that was written 
before AEDPA (hence, there was no statute of limitations that sepa-
rately took care of finality and repose concerns) and which predated 
                                                                                                                                        
 156. “It is thus abundantly clear that the Teague rule of non-retroactivity was fashioned 
to achieve the goals of federal habeas while minimizing federal intrusion into state criminal 
proceedings. It was intended to limit the authority of federal courts to overturn state convic-
tions—not to limit a state court’s authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of con-
stitutional law when reviewing its own State’s convictions.” Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 
264, 280-81 (2008).  
 157. Id. at 284-88 (discussing Justice Scalia’s opinion in Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. 
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987)).  
 158. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69 (1769) 
(stating that the duty of a court is not to “pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound 
the old one”). Under Blackstone’s declaratory approach, adopted by Danforth, a “decision 
interpreted a law [and] did no more than declare what the law had always been.” Notes and 
Comments, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 
YALE L.J. 907, 907 (1962).  
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the shrinkage of federal habeas review, as federal courts were still ex-
amining convictions anew under the Brown v. Allen159 standard. Un-
less they can independently justify a retroactivity rule that forecloses 
relief even when the constitutionality of the underlying conviction or 
sentence is called into serious doubt under the newly found, but always 
constitutionally required rule, state courts should not default to 
Teague, but should instead pursue an anti-Teague regime. The default 
rule should be the availability of a remedy for a recognized constitu-
tional wrong, unless there are independent equitable reasons to deny 
it, so as to avoid entrenchment of constitutionally suspect convictions 
and sentences under the proper understanding of what the Constitu-
tion has always demanded.160   
 States should thus not acquiesce in Teague retroactivity restrictions 
based solely on a purported finality interest (even though that is pre-
cisely what Minnesota did on remand after Danforth, and many other 
states have followed suit).161 First, much of the ‘finality’ work that 
Teague had to do is now superfluous, as statutes of limitations, more 
stringent procedural default rules, and bans on second and successive 
petitions, etc., provide a more direct means of achieving the same 
ends.162 Teague and its immediate progeny were intent on narrowly de-
fining new rules in an era where federal habeas review was much less 
deferential and other tools to cabin relief were unavailable. The flood of 
federal habeas petitions that Teague was built to guard against has now 
been more effectively gated by other devices, as well as state-level post-
conviction procedures, which can better serve these purposes.    
 Thus, in today’s constricted habeas regime, the goal of preserving 
presumptively correct final judgments is more directly carried out by 
a slew of other procedural barriers than it is by restricting the retro-
active application of newly discovered constitutional rules. This is es-
pecially true for rules that, while short of satisfying Teague’s elusive 
watershed exception, nonetheless cast serious doubt on the accuracy 
of the underlying conviction or sentence. If a petitioner seeking habeas 
relief can satisfy all the other procedural gauntlets and bring a color-
able claim that her conviction or sentence is constitutionally suspect 
                                                                                                                                        
 159. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
 160. Cf. Hashimoto, supra note 126, at 139 (arguing that in lieu of the absolute Teague 
bar applicable to federal habeas claims, the Supreme Court should adopt three individualized 
equitable exceptions that take into account the applicants’ conduct in pursuing claims, the mer-
its of the claim and the stakes involved, and the unavailability of alternative remedies).   
 161. See supra Part B.2. 
 162. See supra Part A.2. (describing federal limits on habeas). See generally LARRY W. 
YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES 13 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 2007/2008) (surveying state 
post-conviction proceedings).  
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based on a correct understanding of the law, then finality interests, 
alone, provide insufficient grounds on which to deny review.163    
 Recall, too, that Justice Harlan’s views in Desist and Mackey (that 
were ultimately adopted (and narrowed) by Justice O’Connor’s craft-
ing of the Teague retroactivity bar) arose at a time when the federal 
habeas statute had no statute of limitations, and the federal courts 
were operating under the Brown v. Allen regime of de novo review for 
state court legal errors. Thus, Judge Friendly, writing in 1970, urged 
the cabining of federal habeas relief through more deferential review 
rather than restrictions on retroactive relief.164 In Judge Friendly’s 
view, federal habeas review should be limited to claims that went to 
the heart of the accuracy of proceedings or were grounded in actual 
innocence.165 But once these criteria were satisfied, Judge Friendly had 
no qualms in allowing retroactive application of new criminal proce-
dural rules that would be barred under Teague today, including Con-
frontation Clause, jury selection, and IAC claims that are now Teague-
barred.166 That universe of rules—where rights go to the heart of the 
integrity of criminal proceedings and, therefore, should be remedied 
whenever a violation is discovered—is far broader than that allowed 
today by the Supreme Court. Even contemporaries pre-Teague recog-
nized that there was no need for a high bar on retroactive relief once 
other direct mechanisms to curtail habeas were in place. With reason, 
decisions predicated on an erroneous reading of the Constitution 
should not stand. Period.  
 The inevitable criticism of an approach that allows retroactivity 
only for particularly serious rules is the dilemma posed when deciding 
                                                                                                                                        
 163. At least in federal habeas proceedings, a credible claim of actual innocence can ex-
cuse any procedural default or waiver based on failure to raise the claim earlier in the pro-
ceedings. See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264-66 (2016); McQuiggin v. Perkins, 
133 S. Ct. 1924, 1932 (2013); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1998); Schlup 
v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). An actual innocence claim is more straightforward to make 
in circumstances like Bousley or Welch, where the claim is one of substantive factual inno-
cence, that is, a claim that the defendant did not commit the newly defined crime at all. For 
procedural violations or sentencing errors, even ones of constitutional magnitude, claims of 
actual innocence are more of a stretch. Therefore, procedural barriers to review could be 
more intractable, unless the definition of actual innocence is relaxed, for example, to encom-
pass claims of actual innocence of a sentence. The Supreme Court has expanded the concept 
of actual innocence to embrace actual innocence of a capital sentence. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 
505 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1992). But it has yet to condone the expansion of the concept to the 
non-capital sentencing context. This issue is percolating in the circuits, which are deeply 
divided on the question. See, e.g., Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1148, 1148 n.1 (7th Cir. 
2015); Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 586, 589-90 (10th Cir. 2011); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 
328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 164. Friendly, supra note 129, at 154-56. 
 165. Id. at 154. 
 166. Id. at 153-54.   
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where to draw the line as to which constitutional errors are serious 
enough to merit a remedy after the direct appeal has been concluded. 
A more direct and obvious course that avoids the line-drawing problem 
is to hold that any conviction resulting from constitutional error 
should not stand.  
 The reasoning goes as follows: Danforth’s holding, predicated on the 
Blackstonian law-declaring view of judging, recognized that the cor-
rect understanding of the Constitution is timeless, distinct from the 
retroactive remedy, and always in existence.167 The Court has also 
ruled that the states have an obligation to give full effect to binding 
federal law, as articulated in Griffith, Montgomery, and Yates.168 The 
import is that the default regime in state post-conviction proceedings 
should be one of full retroactivity. Thus, if Danforth is correct that the 
pronouncement of federal law is separate from the question of remedy, 
then once a constitutional norm is properly identified by the Supreme 
Court, the states have an obligation to enforce it in real time because 
the rule was always so. This is true even if the rule is later discovered, 
meaning that the underlying conviction was not correctly decided at 
the time. I therefore advocate for a default regime of full retroactivity, 
absent equitable reasons based on sandbagging, waiver, or other liti-
gation conduct by the applicant that would otherwise counsel against 
allowing the petitioner to benefit from the newly found rule.169   
 Any asserted interest in finality qua finality, moreover, is ever more 
suspect given the recognized mass incarceration crisis this country is 
facing, the increasing condemnation of the carceral state, the growing 
awareness of the flaws and racial bias in the criminal justice system, 
and the recognition that mandatory minimum sentences are unfair 
and ineffective.170 It simply makes no sense to keep people imprisoned 
                                                                                                                                        
 167. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
 168. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 211-12 
(1988) (pre-Teague decision authored by Justice Stevens reversing the South Carolina Supreme 
Court for declining to apply a new application of an old procedural rule retroactively); Griffith 
v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 314-15 (1987). There are no convincing reasons why application of 
a newly discovered (but always correct) procedural rule is not binding upon state post-convic-
tion courts. The general Teague bar is not binding under Danforth, and its rationale is baseless 
once in state court, given other interests that better protect finality.   
 169. Hashimoto, supra note 126, at 172-75 (advocating for an equitably grounded sub-
stitute for Teague that could take account of waiver and forfeiture, but otherwise allow ret-
roactive application of newly discovered rules for those that sought relief that was wrongly 
foreclosed during their direct appeal). 
 170. See Marc Mauer & David Cole, Opinion, How to Lock Up Fewer People, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/opinion/sunday/how-to-lock-up-fewer-
people.html; see also MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN 
OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (2014); Michael Meranze, Pathology of the Carceral State, L.A. REV. 
OF BOOKS (Feb. 4, 2015), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/pathology-carceral-state/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y3V6-TFUD]; Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks at the Annual Meet-
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when there are serious concerns that their constitutional rights have 
been violated or when they are demonstrably serving sentences that 
would be illegal if imposed today.171 Jettisoning of the federally 
grounded Teague regime, for example, would allow those who were 
sentenced under constitutionally suspect regimes to benefit from the 
current—and always correct, per Danforth and Montgomery—under-
standing of what the Constitution requires. The import of this logic is 
that ‘procedural rules,’ such as the Apprendi/Blakely Sixth Amend-
ment line of cases that federal courts and most state courts have de-
clined to apply retroactively in collateral proceedings, should not be 
deemed new but rather newly discovered.172 The similarly situated lit-
igant from Griffith, entitled to be treated similarly under constitu-
tional norms, should, in other words, include post-conviction petition-
ers for relief who were never able to have their claims decided under 
the correct understanding of the Constitution.173  
                                                                                                                                        
ing of the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Attor-
ney General Eric Holder speech], http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-
130812.html [https://perma.cc/AWL8-REL3] (summarizing the evolving research that man-
datory minimums do not work for either rehabilitation or deterrence purposes, as well as 
ongoing state sentencing reform initiatives).  
 171. There is an ever-growing consensus across right and left alike that long-term incar-
ceration is neither efficient nor effective. Executive clemency programs like President 
Obama’s clemency initiative that has already commuted scores of mandatory minimum drug 
sentences, see Press Release, Department of Justice, Announcing New Clemency Initiative, 
Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole Details Broad New Criteria for Applicants (Apr. 23, 
2014), https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-initiative [https://perma.cc/2HRR-XM2G], 
and legislative fixes, state sentencing reform, and similar clemency initiatives at the state level, 
see SUBRAMANIAN & DELANEY, supra note 130, are of course alternative and more direct ap-
proaches. But these reforms on the front end do suggest that the balancing of interests could 
and should be restricted by a post-conviction court in a time in which society is increasingly 
suspicious of the criminal justice system. Maintaining a constitutionally suspect sentence just 
for the sake of not disturbing it, and allowing vindication of a constitutional right that would 
otherwise go unremedied seems increasingly unjustifiable.    
 172. See Jacobs, supra note 49; see also Mark S. Hurwitz, Much Ado About Sentencing: 
The Influence of Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 27 JUST. SYS. 
J. 1, 81-93 (2006).  
 173. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004) (refusing to apply the jury right to 
capital sentencing proceedings announced in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)), is per-
haps the most glaring example. See also Shon Hopwood, Preface—Failing to Fix Sentencing 
Mistakes: How the System of Mass Incarceration May Have Hardened the Hearts of the 
Federal Judiciary, 43 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii (2014). More positive outcomes 
occurred this past term in Montgomery v. Louisiana and Welch v. United States, where the 
Court declared the rules in question to be retroactive, and therefore retroactively applicable 
during collateral proceedings. See supra note 1. States are bound to follow these decisions 
under Montgomery, and to the extent that states have ACCA clones with similar residual 
clauses, this issue will also arise at the state level. The federal precedent set in Welch will 
be, at the least, persuasive and arguably binding. See also Beckles v. United States, 137 S. 
Ct. 23 (2016) (granting certiorari in a case asking whether Johnson v. United States applies 
retroactively to collateral cases challenging sentences enhanced under the federal sentenc-
ing guidelines residual clause). 
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 Consider the following hypothetical: If Congress passed a law that 
increased the punishment of those already convicted and imprisoned—
let’s say it doubled everyone’s sentences—such legislative action would 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, even though the prisoners’ convictions 
were already final, because it would result in the imposition of a pun-
ishment greater than that allowed at the time of conviction.174 Yet, re-
fusing to allow a prisoner to take advantage of governing law that has 
‘found’ the correct understanding of the Constitution, and which would 
lessen her sentence if applied to her situation (or, in the extreme, pre-
vent her execution), has the same ultimate effect, just in the opposite 
direction. In the first scenario, application of a new law increasing pun-
ishment violates the Constitution. In the second, the Teague regime 
countenances refusal to abide by an old, but newly discovered law that 
would clearly diminish punishment. The net effect, a punishment longer 
than that which is constitutionally permissible, is the same.   
 In neither scenario does the fact that the prisoner’s conviction is al-
ready ‘final’ matter much to the fundamental question of whether a pris-
oner is serving a punishment more severe than that allowed by the Con-
stitution. To be sure, the ex post facto legislative prohibitions are not 
only constitutionally mandated, but grounded in fair notice and deter-
rence functions that are purportedly served by linking crimes to set pun-
ishments. But the strength of any ‘reliance’ interest by wrongdoers on 
the nature of the punishment is dubious at best.175 Notice rationales, 
moreover, have been steadily undermined by the malleability of plea 
bargains and abuses in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, etc.176 
The growing wave of opposition to draconian mandatory minimums and 
unyielding truth in sentencing schemes also demonstrates skepticism 
about the independent value of preserving initial sentences that are to-
day viewed as unfair and ineffective.177 At bottom, the fundamental fair-
ness concerns that are constitutionally protected by the Ex Post Facto 
                                                                                                                                        
 174. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 386, 397 (1798) (“The enhancement of a crime, or 
penalty, seems to come within the same mischief as the creation of a crime or penalty; and 
therefore they may be classed together.”); see also Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 
2088 (2013) (finding that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits federal courts from sentencing 
a defendant based on guidelines promulgated after a crime was committed, when the new 
version of the guidelines provides a higher sentencing range than the version in place at the 
time of the offense). 
 175. For general discussions of the rationales for and against retroactive relief, see Fisch, 
supra note 21; Harrington, supra note 38; and Harold J. Krent, Should Bouie be Buoyed?: 
Judicial Retroactive Lawmaking and the Ex Post Facto Clause, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 35, 73-74 (1997) (discussing the oddity of suggesting that there is a legitimate reliance 
interest in the criminal context). 
 176. See, e.g., Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 
AM. ECON. REV. 713 (1988); William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Dis-
crimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980). 
 177. See Attorney General Eric Holder speech, supra note 170.   
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Clause appear to be equally offended by allowing a prisoner to continue 
to serve a sentence that is, under the correct understanding of the Con-
stitution, beyond the constitutionally permissible limits.178 
D.   Why Defense Counsel Should Care More About State Post-Con-
viction Proceedings 
 Hypotheticals aside, while recognizing the inertial pull of Teague 
and the difficulties of convincing state courts to change their course, I 
nonetheless close with this practical coda, joining others who have 
stressed the need for the criminal defense bar to press the battle 
against Teague, and take full advantage of the potential opportunities 
for relief provided in state post-conviction proceedings (and the unfet-
tered Supreme Court review that can follow).179  
 Judgments from state court post-conviction proceedings are rarely 
the source of Supreme Court cases, and as a leading habeas treatise 
observes, when they are, it is usually because the state, not the crimi-
nal defendant, has successfully petitioned for review.180 But every now 
and again, a state habeas petitioner gets certiorari granted from a 
state post-conviction loss, which allows the law to evolve on direct re-
view in a way that it never could on habeas review given the con-
straints imposed by Teague and AEDPA.181 
                                                                                                                                        
 178. There are also strong arguments that finality interests are greatly reduced when the 
challenge is to the length of the sentence rather than the underlying conviction, as questions 
such as stale witnesses, etc., do not arise. See Douglas Berman, Distinguishing Finality Inter-
ests Between Convictions and Sentences, SENT’G L. & POL’Y BLOG (Dec. 15, 2006, 9:51 AM), 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2006/12/distinguishing_.html 
[https://perma.cc/ETA7-V2ZD]; Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Con-
gress, and Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 139-40 (2012).  
 179. See, e.g., Shay, supra note 151, at 474. Shay calls Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 
(2012), the “Gideon for state postconviction” and makes the point that state post-conviction 
proceedings both provide the best opportunity for certain federal law claims to be litigated 
and act as a vehicle that provides lower courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, with the 
cleanest opportunity, shorn of the veil of AEDPA deference, to decide open questions of fed-
eral constitutional procedure. See also, Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating a 
New Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking Certio-
rari from Judgments of State Courts, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (2008) (making the unfet-
tered review point and also noting that state defendants can choose to waive the Teague 
defense in federal court, but rarely do so). 
 180. 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 6.1, at 341-43 (6th ed. 2011). 
 181. It also bears noting that, under AEDPA, a federal court will only reach questions 
decided by the state courts under “clearly established . . . law” and reverse such decisions 
under a highly deferential standard. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). Teague prohibits federal 
courts not only from applying new procedural rules retroactively, but also from making new 
rules during habeas proceedings, thereby severely stunting the lawmaking function of the 
lower federal courts. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299, 316 (1989); Fallon & Meltzer, supra 
note 23, at 1746-48. 
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 Padilla v. Kentucky,182 which expanded the boundaries of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel to encompass ineffective assistance in de-
portation proceedings, was one such case. In Padilla, more aggressive 
pursuit of state post-conviction remedies allowed a new rule expanding 
the right to counsel to evolve by the Supreme Court’s direct review of 
a state post-conviction proceeding. This ruling allowed constitutional 
norms to evolve, as the Supreme Court can review such legal decisions 
de novo, unencumbered by AEDPA’s filters.183 If the Padilla issue had 
arisen during review of a federal habeas case, the Court would never 
have reached it.  
 But there is a time trap for the unwary. In Lawrence v. Florida,184 
the Court held that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is not sub-
ject to tolling during the pendency of state post-conviction proceed-
ings.185 In her dissent, one of the points made by Justice Ginsburg was 
that this rule would pose a procedural obstacle thwarting completion 
of state post-conviction proceedings through Supreme Court review, 
and “unnecessarily encumber the federal courts with anticipatory fil-
ings and deprive unwitting litigants of the opportunity to pursue their 
constitutional claims.”186  
 Such a barrier to crafting federally uniform law on issues that can 
only arise in post-conviction settings impedes the evolution of consti-
tutional protections. Supreme Court review of state post-conviction 
proceedings is arguably the only opportunity that the Court has to cor-
rect constitutional errors on those claims (like ineffective assistance 
on appeal or post-appeal Brady claims) that can be litigated for the 
first time only in post-conviction proceedings—the initial review col-
lateral claims.187 This opportunity to move the law forward, one una-
vailable in federal habeas proceedings, cannot be overstated—nor can 
the importance of seeking Supreme Court review of state post-convic-
tion rulings, notwithstanding the procedural gauntlets that must be 
overcome to do so without running afoul of AEDPA’s statute of limita-
tions.188 The preferred course is thus to seek certiorari on the judgment 
of the state post-conviction court from the Supreme Court, while sim-
ultaneously pursuing a federal habeas remedy, and then to move for a 
                                                                                                                                        
 182. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 183. Teague’s bar against making new rules on habeas is grounded, at least in part, in 
Article III’s prohibitions against advisory opinions, which may be inapposite in many states. 
See Schapiro, supra note 125, at 302-04.    
 184. 549 U.S. 327 (2007). 
 185. Id. at 337. 
 186. Id. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 187. See also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1261 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(dissenting on the importance of state post-conviction review). 
 188. 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 180, at 343.   
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stay of the federal proceedings pending resolution of the state action. 
As Justice Ginsburg observed in Lawrence, this is of course unneces-
sarily cumbersome and burdensome on litigants and courts alike.189 
But, I would argue, it is worth the effort to ensure that the law contin-
ues to evolve, or be rightly ‘discovered.’ 
 State courts, moreover, as the ‘ultimate guardians’ of federal rights 
in our constitutional scheme, ought to be reminded of their obligation 
to fill a constitutional void left by the erosion of federal habeas relief. 
To date, I am unaware of any state court decision that has expressly 
considered this structural constitutional obligation in determining 
whether to follow Teague or chart an independent course. Particularly 
for those state courts that have yet to rule on whether Teague applies 
(about one-third of jurisdictions), a viable litigation strategy would be 
to propose an “anti-Teague” regime of full retroactivity, absent equita-
ble reasons precluding relief, precisely because federal courts offer no 
forum. Fundamental to our constitutional structure is the principal 
that every right demands a remedy.190   
 In sum, seeking certiorari of state post-conviction rulings provides 
the best clean shot for development of new constitutional rules govern-
ing post-conviction procedures. State post-conviction proceedings may 
also provide the last clear shot of adding to the factual record.191 Ag-
gressive pursuit of retroactive relief in state post-conviction proceed-
ings—including pressing the arguments that state statute of limita-
tions and other procedural bars are better suited to serve finality in-
terests than arbitrary retroactivity restrictions designed for another 
purpose—may also, with the arc of history, provide the basis for the 
Supreme Court to rethink the Teague bar, or at the very least, become 
less stingy with respect to the Teague exceptions.    
 That over half the states had held that the rule announced in Miller 
v. Alabama (that juveniles could not be constitutionally sentenced to 
mandatory life without parole) should be given retroactive effect before 
the Supreme Court even ruled in Montgomery could not have escaped 
                                                                                                                                        
 189. Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 343-45.   
 190. On the flip side, I would strongly advocate against any concession by a petitioner in 
state post-conviction proceedings that Teague governs, as was the case, for example, in State 
v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 499 (Wyo. 2014). 
 191. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1410-11 (2011), which held that review under 
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the notice of the Court, when Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority 
confirming the same as a matter of now-binding federal law.192 State 
courts can serve as working laboratories to demonstrate, through their 
evolving considered practice, that allowing habeas petitioners to ben-
efit from the increasing recognition of constitutional protections that 
cast doubt on the legality of their convictions and sentences is not only 
fundamentally fair, but also practically achievable.  
 
                                                                                                                                        
 192. Although the Montgomery majority opinion did not cite any state court rulings in sup-
port of its holding that Miller was a substantive rule, there was ample briefing in the case  
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http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/montgomery-v-louisiana/ [https://perma.cc/XN3H-3U3K].   
